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COMP ARA TIVE DROUGHT STRATEGIES 
THE SOVIET UNION 
PAUL E. L YDOLPH 
T he Russian experience must be understood 
in terms of some major contrasts between the 
Soviet Union and North America, some of 
which are climatic and some cultural. 
CLIMATE 
Background. It cannot be emphasized 
enough that the Soviet Union is a high-
latitude country. Odessa on the Black Sea 
coast, one of Russia's southern cities, lies at a 
latitude of 46°N, comparable to that of 
Billings, Montana, and in fact is cooler in 
summer than Billings (Lydolph 1977b). Kras-
nodar in the Kuban District of the North 
Caucasus, probably the most productive re-
gion in the Soviet Union, compares latitudi-
nally and climatically to St. Paul, Minnesota. 
Kharkov, in the northeastern Ukraine, com-
pares to Winnipeg, Canada; in fact, Winnipeg 
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experiences higher maximum temperatures in 
summer than Kharkov does. The central black 
earth region of the Russian Republic lies even 
farther north. Thus, most of the farmland of 
the Soviet Union is more comparable latitudi-
nally and climatically to parts of Canada than 
to the United States. In the wheat lands of 
southwestern Siberia, Omsk, at a latitude of 
55°, lies farther north than any agricultural 
settlement in Canada, except perhaps the 
Peace River Valley, which, of course, is only a 
restricted area. In these northern regions, the 
Soviets must consider not only moisture 
supply but always heat supply as well (Lydolph 
1963). 
The other primary climatic control, topog-
raphy, in Eurasia is oriented almost perpendic-
ularly to that in North America. Whereas high 
mountains run north-south in the western 
part of North America, Eurasia has high 
mountains running west-east across the 
southern part of the continent. This topogra-
phy accounts for moisture gradients in the two 
land masses that are essentially perpendicular 
to each other. (Lydolph 1977d). In North 
America east of the Rocky Mountains, mois-
ture supply decreases from east to west. In the 
Soviet Union, it decreases from north to 
south. Thus, whereas in eastern North Ameri-
ca the temperature and moisture gradients are 
essentially perpendicular to one another, in 
the Soviet Union they are parallel and oppo-
site in direction, leading to fewer combinations 
of heat and moisture supply than can be found 
in eastern North America. In the Soviet 
Union the north is cold, wet, and poorly 
drained while the warmer south is dry. Except 
for very small areas, such as the Colchis 
Lowland of western Georgia in the T ranscau-
casus, there is no long, hot, or very moist 
growing season. 
Therefore, agriculture in the Soviet Union 
is scrunched between the cold north and the 
dry south. And since heat limitations on crop 
production generally come into play before 
moisture limitations do, the better agriculture 
in the Soviet Union has become concentrated 
in the steppes of southern Russia, the Ukraine, 
and northern Kazakhstan (fig. 1). Thus, the 
semiarid zone of the Soviet Union by and large 
FIG. 1. Distribution of sown area in the USSR. 
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is the best agricultural area the Soviet Union 
has to offer, whereas the Great Plains do not 
constitute the prime agricultural area of the 
United States. That means the Soviet Union, 
much more than the United States, must 
produce its food and fiber in a hazardous 
climate, and its possible crop combinations are 
considerably more limited than those in the 
United States. There simply is not an ideal 
place to grow corn or soybeans in the Soviet 
Union. 
The human element. There are about forty 
million more people in the Soviet Union than 
in the United States, so the Soviets must try to 
feed more people by agriculture that is carried 
on in a less conducive environment. Also, 
since most of the people reside in the fertile 
wedge of agricultural land occupying only a 
small portion of the country, population 
pressure on farmland has always been much 
higher in the Soviet Union than in either the 
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United States or Canada. While the rural 
population density is approximately 8 persons 
per square mile in Nebraska, 10 in Kansas, and 
5 in North Dakota, it is 142 in Vinnitsa Oblast 
of the western Ukraine, 184 in adjacent 
Moldavia, 67 in Kharkov Oblast of the eastern 
Ukraine, and 73 in Krasnodar Oblast in the 
North Caucasus (Narodnoe khozyaystvo 
SSSR v 1983g). Even the drier middle Volga 
region has a rural population density of 21 
persons per square mile, and the dry steppe 
regions of western Siberia and northern 
Kazakhstan average about 12-13 persons per 
square mile. Thus, there are many more people 
trying to make their livelihood off the land in 
the Soviet Union than in North America. 
Land tenure. The land tenure system 
throughout T sarist times was detrimental to 
conservation of the land. The peasant who 
worked the land never had much vested 
interest in it. Before emancipation of the serfs 
in 1861 most agricultural land was held in large 
estates owned either by the Crown, the 
orthodox church, or noblemen. And after the 
emancipation most of this land did not pass 
over to the peasants directly. Much of the land 
that was eventually divided up was turned 
over to the miT, or village, to be held and 
worked communally. 
The arable land was frequently reappor-
tioned, so individual peasant households were 
never sure how long they might have control 
of the same fields. Also, fields were usually laid 
out in long, narrow strips oriented parallel to 
slopes so that each household would be 
assured of all portions of the soil catena. 
Although this arrangement fostered equity 
among households, it wreaked havoc with the 
land. Deep gullies rapidly developed in furrows 
oriented downslope, and the uncertainty of 
land tenure induced farmers to invest as little 
as possible in the land while extracting the 
most from it during their control of it. Thus, 
soil fertility depletion and tremendous erosion 
took place over hundreds of years of land use, 
the rectification of which has only been 
addressed during the Soviet period. Of course, 
the Soviets have formed huge state and 
collective farms, so that farm workers still do 
not have much vested interest in the land, but 
state directives and incentives since the death 
of Stalin have greatly improved farming prac-
tices. 
Rural settlement. The steppe peasants have 
always lived in large rural villages strung 
helter-skelter in the stream valleys, out of the 
wind and near water and woods along the 
stream banks. In their never-ending quest for 
wood for fuel for their thatched adobe khatas 
during the long cold winters, the peasants 
denuded the steep stream banks of their 
wooded cover and further increased the ero-
sion problem. 
Self-sufficiency. Exacerbating the environ-
mental limits placed on agriculture, which are 
already being pushed to the edge of disaster, is 
the Soviet desire to be as self-sufficient as 
possible in all products. This has led to the 
formulation of a hierarchy of priorities that 
often results in a given crop being grown under 
less than ideal conditions, even when ideal 
conditions exist somewhere in the Soviet 
Union. Briefly, a specialty crop that cannot be 
grown anywhere else in the Soviet Union will 
take first priority in the region in which it can 
be grown. If a region is not needed for a 
specialty crop, the most heavily yielding crop 
will take priority even though it may be 
growing under less than optimum conditions. 
If an area does not need to be used for the most 
heavily producing crop, then perhaps the crop 
most ideally suited to that location will be 
grown (Lydolph 1979,235). 
Cotton, citrus, and tea are good examples 
of specialty crops that can only be grown in 
the very southern fringes of the country in 
portions of Central Asia and the T ranscauca-
sus. During the Soviet era, cotton has expand-
ed in Central Asia wherever it can be grown 
and has displaced many food crops, particular-
ly wheat and other grains, that used to satisfy 
all the needs of the native populations in this 
area. Thus, the Soviets have achieved self-
sufficiency in cotton but have necessitated the 
shipment of many foodstuffs into Central Asia 
from other parts of the country. Similarly, in 
western Georgia wherever citrus or tea can be 
grown, they generally displace other crops. 
Corn is a good example of a heavily 
bearing crop that has displaced lesser yielding 
crops. When Khrushchev initiated his farm 
program in the mid-1950s, his primary objec-
tive was to improve the diet of the Soviet 
people, primarily by increasing livestock prod-
ucts. This entailed a greatly expanded feed and 
fodder base. Having visited Iowa, he was very 
impressed with the sheer weight of green 
matter that can be grown by corn. Therefore, 
he rapidly ordered the planting of millions of 
acres of corn in the Soviet Union. In order to 
get decent yields the Soviets had to put corn in 
regions offering the best combination of soil, 
moisture, and heat. These regions were gener-
ally in portions of the Ukraine and the Kuban 
district of the North Caucasus, the best winter 
wheat areas of the country (Lydolph 1979, 
247). Consequently, winter wheat had to be 
displaced, and in order to maintain the level of 
wheat production, the Soviets looked around 
for other wheat-growing areas. They finally 
settled upon the so-called Virgin Lands of 
northern Kazakhstan and parts of adjacent 
regions. Because this new area was considerab-
ly drier than the old wheat areas and had 
much more severe winters with less snow 
cover, wheat varieties had to be switched from 
fall-sown to lower-yielding spring-sown. Wheat 
yields in the "new lands" have consistently run 
about half those in the winter wheat areas 
(Cook et al. 1985, 5). So now the Soviets are 
growing corn in a less than ideal area where 
yields look pretty miserable and where much 
of the corn can never be harvested as dry grain 
but must be cut for silage and green fodder. 
And because they are now growing a great deal 
of their wheat in less than ideal conditions, the 
yields look miserable by American or western 
European standards. Nevertheless, by intro-
ducing these shifts in crops, the Soviets have 
significantly increased their overall agricultural 
production, particularly livestock products. 
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The desire for self-sufficiency has forced the 
climate even further than was the case earlier. 
A given deviation in moisture or heat supplies 
during the growing season will generally 
produce a more marked deviation in crop 
response now that many crops are being grown 
closer to their margins of disaster. Only during 
the last few years, after a combination of 
circumstances has produced a series of mediocre-
to-poor crops, have the Soviets apparently 
retreated from this position of absolute self-
sufficiency and decided to become permanent 
major importers of feed and foodstuffs. As the 
Soviet appetite has been whetted, the Soviet 
leadership has apparently decided that it is 
cheaper to import certain things than it is to 
pour further investments into their attempts to 
grow them. This is not to say that they have 
ceased attempts to improve their own agricul-
ture. This has certainly not been the case 
during the last three decades, for they are still 
pouring a disproportionate twenty-seven per-
cent of their total capital investment each year 
into agriculture, which accounts for only 
about twenty percent of the gross national 
product. Some western economists estimate 
that Soviet agriculture is now the most heavily 
subsidized agriculture in the world. 
ADAPTATION TO 
SEMIARID CONDITIONS 
Agriculturalists whose lands now lie within 
the Soviet Union have struggled with nature 
in the steppes of Eurasia for more than a 
thousand years, during which they have 
evolved a way of life that is pretty well adapted 
to the natural environment. During the later 
years of the T sarist regime and throughout the 
Soviet period, scientific organizations have 
carried out high quality investigations under 
the direction of such eminent scholars as the 
soil scientist V. V. Dokuchaev and the clima-
tologist A. 1. Voyeykov. Although practice 
has often lagged well behind scientific discov-
ery because of lack of funds, unwieldly organi-
zation, and peasant ignorance, many wide-
sweeping programs have been instituted, par-
ticularly during the Soviet period. 
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Irrigation. Irrigation has long been the 
primary means of improving the moisture 
balance in dry areas. It was practiced for 
thousands of years by the natives in the 
riverine civilizations of Central Asia, but the 
Soviets have expanded it well into the steppe-
lands of Moldavia, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, 
the lower Volga, northern Kazakhstan, and 
southern Siberia (fig. 2) (Lydolph 1977c, 102, 
149, 246, 272). There is now more area under 
irrigation in the Russian Republic than in the 
Uzbek Republic of Central Asia, the tradition-
al heartland of irrigation. After all, the same 
amount of water can be spread over more land 
in semiarid than in arid regions. 
At present the Soviet Union has approxi-
mately twenty million hectares (about fifty 
million acres) of land under irrigation, which 
reportedly account for about one-third of the 
crop production in the country. In contrast to 
earlier times when irrigation was limited to 
technical crops (cotton, etc.) and some fruits 
eo 
FIG. 2. Irrigation in the USSR. 
and vegetables, it is being applied extensively 
to forage crops and grains now that the Soviets 
emphasize livestock products. In 1983, out of a 
total sown area under irrigation of 15,288,100 
hectares, 6,815,100 were occupied by fodder 
crops (alfalfa, silage corn, etc.); 3,691,300 by 
grains; 3,640,900 by technical crops; and 
1,140,800 by potatoes, vegetables, and melons. 
The rest of the 19,146,000 hectares of irrigated 
land was in permanent pastures, natural 
hayland, vineyards, orchards, and other per-
ennial uses (N arodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 
1983g., 252-54). 
The Soviets look to irrigation as the 
primary means of intensifying agriculture on 
land long cultivated by dry farming methods, 
something they must do since they have little 
virgin arable land left to open up to cultiva-
tion. But so far they have been slow in 
adopting new water-saving technologies to 
their water application in steppe regions. They 
still rely primarily on furrow irrigation that 
• 
Conoenu ..... 
IlTig~ 
they adapted from the long-irrigated desert 
oases of Central Asia, where inefficient and 
wasteful open-ditch methods are still predomi-
nant. Sprinkler irrigation is being introduced 
fairly rapidly in such places as the southern 
Ukraine, Lower Volga, and North Caucasus 
regions. Sprinkler systems include tractor-
boom, tractor-spout, center-pivot, and wheel. 
Center-pivot with a radius of 456 meters 
(about 1500 feet) is becoming the most favored 
method. One-time annual flood irrigation is 
being practiced on floodplains, particularly to 
improve pastures and natural hay lands. The 
Soviets are beginning to talk about drip 
irrigation for tree and vine crops. 
The Soviets are installing some covered 
conduits and lining canals to counter seepage 
and evaporation, but they have a long way to 
go. In this regard, an interesting suggestion has 
been made for a pilot project to transfer some 
water from western Siberia to central Asia 
using the two pipelines installed during the late 
1950s and early 1960s to convey natural gas 
from the Gazli fields near Bukhara, Uzbekis-
tan, to the Urals. These pipes are no longer 
being used, and with some hookup eastward 
they could carry excess Siberian water south-
ward to see how it would best be utilized in 
central Asia. The Soviets are also experiment-
ing with protective films to retard evaporation 
from open-water surfaces and canal liners, 
such as polyethylene, to counter seepage. 
Some irrigated areas are being equipped with 
underground drainage networks to combat 
secondary salinization. Unfortunately, no pre-
cise information is available on the location 
and extent of such efforts or their degree of 
success. 
In many areas of the southern part of the 
country there is not enough water to carry out 
extensive plans for Irngation expansion. 
Therefore, the ultimate plan has long been to 
transfer water from northward-flowing rivers 
into the southern dry lands (fig. 3). This topic 
has elicited much discussion throughout the 
Soviet Union and is still very much up in the 
air. New concerns keep delaying projects, and 
so far very little has been accomplished. At 
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present it appears that, although the Soviets 
might be on the verge of initiating a scaled-
down project on the small Sukhona River in 
the European north, most of the larger proj-
ects are back on "square one" as planners 
weigh advantages of investments of this sort 
against investments in other sectors of their 
economy and consider more efficient use of 
water in dry areas. 
Central planners, who appear to exhibit 
some regional and racial biases, point out that 
the Uzbeks of central Asia have allowed 
irrigation systems to fall into disrepair. Canals 
are leaky, and little is done to limit evapora-
tion from them. Drainage systems are inade-
quate, so that brackish water accumulates and 
secondary salinization occurs. The central 
Asians have not yet done much to tap large 
local water supplies in underground artesian 
basins and high mountain glaciers, nor have 
they done much to recycle water in industrial 
plants or to switch to dry processing where 
possible. As a first measure to bring about 
some conservation, the government has re-
cently initiated charges for water. This seems 
to a Westerner something to be done without 
saying, but it has not automatically been seen 
as a thing to do within the Soviet ideological 
context. It now appears that the Soviets view 
interbasin water transfer as a last resort after 
all other possibilities have been exhausted. 
Any long-term plans to divert water will 
consist of discrete shorter-term projects which 
can be completed in stages so that investments 
will not be irrevocably locked into huge 
unfinished projects. 
The Soviets are well aware of the heat 
balance advantages of irrigation. The reduction 
of albedo, the reduction of surface temperature, 
the increase of relative humidity of the air next 
to the earth's surface, with consequent reduction 
of evaporation and earth radiation-all add up 
to significantly increased heat balance available 
for plant growth at the earth's surface. And 
since, with few exceptions, even the warmer 
parts of the Soviet Union are deficient in heat 
resources, any subtle gains of usable heat loom 
large to the Soviets. 
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FIG. 3. Schematic map of water diversion projects. Width of arrow proportional to volume of 
transfer. I. Northwest project; II. Northeast; III. Danube to southern Ukraine; IV. Lower Ob to 
Pechora-Kama; V. Western Siberia to Kazakhstan and Central Asia. A. From Tobol Reservoir and 
Ob River at Belogorye. B. From Tom and Chulym Rivers and Novosibirsk Reservoir. C. From both 
A and B. 
Other measures to ameliorate soil moisture. 
Many measures other than irrigation have 
been taken to conserve soil moisture and to 
adapt crops to existing conditions. Over the 
last fifty to sixty years the Soviets have planted 
an exceedingly extensive system of shelter belts 
throughout much of the steppe region and 
irrigated portions of desert areas. Farms in 
these areas generally have been required to 
plant rows of trees on all four sides of large 
fields. The state has undertaken the planting 
of wide strips of trees and bushes for hundreds 
of miles along such places as the high west bluff 
of the Volga River from Volgograd in the 
south to Ulyanovsk in the north and in the 
Kulunda Steppe in Altay Kray of western 
Siberia. Shelter belts usually line both sides of 
major highways and are often augmented by 
fifteen to twenty rows of apple trees back from 
the highway between the shelter belts and the 
open fields, thus serving both to break the 
wind and to supply much-needed fruit. Many 
city streets and boulevard medians are also 
lined with fruit trees, mainly hardy apple 
varieties. In the south, irrigation ditches are 
usually lined by dense stands of poplar trees. 
Apparently, the Soviets consider the reduction 
of wind and the aesthetic value of the trees to 
outweigh their rather high water consump-
tion. 
The reduction of wind reduces evaporation 
during summer and retains snow on fields 
during winter to augment soil moisture and 
reduce erosion due to runoff during spring 
melt. The Soviets have found the most effec-
tive shelter belts to be several rather widely 
spaced rows of trees and shrubs of varying 
heights that will produce maximum turbulence 
in the airflow, thereby slowing the forward 
motion to a minimum. This arrangement will 
combat wind erosion, reduce evaporation to a 
minimum, and spread snow most evenly over 
fields. Although their shelter belts look rather 
scraggly compared to those in the northern 
Great Plains of North America, perhaps they 
are more effective than the beautiful and dense 
shelter belts in the Dakotas that do not allow 
much air to pass through. The wind often 
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swoops over these barriers relatively unim-
peded, drops most of the snow on the lee sides, 
and continues to sweep downwind fields clean. 
This not only means that most of the field area 
receives no water from snow melt but also 
delays spring planting while the snowpack 
immediately to the lee of the shelter belt slowly 
melts. In drier parts of the steppes the Soviets 
usually find indigenous plants to be more 
suitable to shelter belt plantings, but in the 
moister wooded steppe of the Central Cherno-
zem Region and western Ukraine they have 
introduced such indestructable trees as the box 
elder (acer negundo) from North America. 
The Soviets have led in working out 
effective soil management procedures such as 
minimum tillage, furrow plowing, high stubble 
refuse, and water harvesting, although such 
efforts in practice have often been deflected by 
crash program directives from central plan-
ners. Some of the most damaging decisions 
dictated from above have resulted in the 
reduction of fallowing in semiarid regions and 
the neglect of oats as a cover crop in the 
rotation scheme. Such measures in the short 
run have perhaps in certain areas increased the 
overall production of food grains, but in the 
long run they have depleted soil and moisture 
resources. During the last few years, as grain 
production has stagnated, the Soviets have 
found it necessary to address these problems. 
Part of the recent reduction in grain produc-
tion can be attributed to reduced grain-sown 
area, increased fallowing, and shifts of grain 
lands to forage and other crops. This has 
already paid off in record feed stocks for the 
production of livestock products that now 
constitute an estimated fifty-six percent of total 
agricultural production (Cook and Koopman 
1985, 25). And improved soil moisture and 
fertility have helped to. even out some of the 
year-to-year fluctuations in total crop produc-
tion in the country. Crash programs directed 
from the center still often interrupt multiyear 
rotation schemes embarked upon at the farm 
level, some of which are quite long since such 
crops as sugar beets and sunflowers must be 
planted in the same fields only once every five 
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years or so in order to avoid diseases, while 
legumes such as alfalfa and clover usually are 
left in the same fields as many years as possible 
because of the high cost of replanting. 
The inadequacy of herbicides is still a 
major problem. Most Soviet agronomists agree 
that the single most detrimental factor in crop 
production is simply weeds. During the 1985 
growing season, when the Soviets were con-
serving oil for export, fallowed fields were not 
kept clean because farmers lacked fuel for 
proper machine work in unplanted fields, and 
weeds destroyed the fallowing effect. 
It appears that the Soviets are not yet doing 
enough contour plowing, terracing, and strip 
cropping to combat water erosion properly. 
Such practices are often subverted by the 
creation of mammoth fields worked by behe-
moth machines. 
On the positive side, Soviet geneticists 
have been leaders in developing drought-resis-
tant, heavily-yielding, and early-maturing va-
rieties of crops. But more productive varieties 
have generally lower protein and gluten con-
tent and are more susceptible to winter kill 
(Kogan 1983, 645). Early-maturing varieties of 
winter wheat break dormancy earlier in spring 
and thereby become more sensitive to late 
frosts. Therefore, although winter wheat yields 
have significantly increased, grain quality has 
decreased, and the percent of sown area killed 
during winter has increased. 
Complementary areas. One practice to mini-
mize large annual swings in crop yields is 
afforded the Soviets more than any other 
country because of the west-east extent of their 
agricultural land. The standing waves of the 
upper troposphere-which are especially ac-
centuated in the upper middle latitudes, 
around 50-60°, within which much of the 
Soviet agricultural land lies-are positioned 
such that the older farming regions of the 
Ukraine and adjacent Russian Republic are 
approximately one-half wavelength apart from 
northern Kazakhstan. Thus, when one region 
is getting below normal moisture supply, the 
other region is usually getting above normal 
supply, thereby compensating somewhat for 
reduced yields in the drier area. This was a 
major consideration during the 1950s in con-
vincing the Soviets to open up the Virgin 
Lands in northern Kazakhstan and adjacent 
regions. Most years this west-east division of 
moisture supply has obtained (Lydolph, et. al. 
1984). (Since most storms track southwest-
northeast across the southern plains of Euro-
pean U.S.S.R. and Western Siberia, the divid-
ing line between above-normal and below-
normal precipitation generally runs in a south-
west-northeast direction rather than straight 
south to north.) Therefore, one of the major 
adaptations that the Soviets have made to 
optimize grain production in semiarid regions 
is to grow similar crops in areas spaced one-
half atmospheric wavelength apart. This, of 
course, is not possible for smaller countries or 
even for eastern North America where the 
semiarid lands extend north-south rather than 
west-east. 
The non-chernozem project. Another way to 
combat drought is to avoid planting in 
drought-prone areas. In a country where 
everything is directed from the center, the 
state can decree differences in regional devel-
opment. The fifteen-year plan that was an-
nounced in 1974 included several main thrusts 
for the economy, number one of which was 
the complete habilitation of farming and living 
conditions in the non-chernozem zone of 
European Russia. Many advantages of this 
zone over the drier zone to the south were 
noted to substantiate this decision. In contrast 
to the steppelands, this zone has a reliable 
moisture supply and mineral fertilizers can be 
added heavily without the risk of toxic burn-
ing of crops. Of course, not much was said 
about the reduced heat resources of this area 
compared to those of the steppes. Grandiose 
plans were drawn up to drain swamps, bull-
doze copses and old fence rows, consolidate 
fields for more efficient use of machinery, 
improve roads, and consolidate villages for the 
provision of a complete range of amenities 
such as schools and medical clinics (Lydolph 
1977a). 
However, this program seems to have 
stagnated. Aside from the obvious drawback 
of lack of heat, the Soviets ran into a problem 
with resettlement when they sought to estab-
lish villages with minimum populations of five 
thousand people because this area in many 
places is sparsely populated. Therefore, if many 
small villages are consolidated into one large 
village, farmers will have to be transported 
many miles to their fields. All things consid-
ered, it appears that the greatest reliance on 
crop production will remain in the steppelands 
of the south. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus it appears that Soviet agriculture will 
continue to labor under stricter environmental 
constraints than American agriculture does. 
The best the Soviet Union has to offer is a 
compromise between the too-cool north and 
the too-dry south, the sub humid-semiarid zone 
where neither heat nor moisture is abundant. 
Soviet scientists have investigated many ways 
to optimize heat and moisture resources and 
have recommended uses of complementary 
areas within the huge landmass that they 
control, but practice lags way behind scientific 
discovery, and many schemes that might be 
physically feasible, such as interbasin transfers 
of water, might not prove to be economically 
or ecologically desirable. It appears that the 
Soviet leadership might already have made the 
unstated decision to become permanent im-
porters of grain while diverting arable land to 
more forage for animals and fallow to sustain 
long-term use. The Soviet Union is already 
importing about twenty percent of all food-
stuffs it consumes. If the Soviets can find 
exports, such as expanded petroleum and 
natural gas, to raise the necessary hard curren-
cy, they might well decide that it is cheaper to 
import many kinds of agricultural products 
than it is to produce them. 
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